UNITED STATES v. TEAGUE, USCA-1 No. 05-1789, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 29293, appeal from USDC-MAD, before Circuit Judges Torruella and Lynch and USDJ-MED Woodcock, opinion by Woodcock, filed 29 Nov 2006.
LONG STORY SHORT: A person caught unloading drugs from a vehicle cannot have the evidence suppressed on grounds that police discovered the trafficking scheme by illegally stopping that vehicle the day before. Binding in MA, ME, NH, RI.
FACTS: On 23 Oct 2003, Sugar and Stark were driving a 39-foot RV on I-44 in St. Louis County, Missouri when they saw a sign stating that a drug checkpoint, complete with drug-sniffing K9, was set up after Sugar Tree Road exit. Sugar and Stark exited there even though Sugar Tree Road has no gas, food, lodging, or other usual reasons to take an exit. However, it does have a convenient hiding place for police cars at the end of the off-ramp, and I-44 is a known drug conduit, so police frequently set up checkpoint signs and follow vehicles that take the exit. Inevitably, a subject vehicle will commit a traffic infraction, whereupon officers stop the vehicle and ask for consent to search; if consent is not forthcoming, police detain the vehicle until a (real) drug K9 arrives for a sniff test. Sugar and Stark were no exception, and after their RV veered over the fog line on a 2-lane road, police stopped them and found 27 bales of marijuana in a closet. Sugar and Stark decided to cooperate, and drove on to Marlboro, Massachusetts, where Defendant and two other men in a white Lexus met the RV in a Holiday Inn parking lot and began transferring the marijuana to the Lexus in broad daylight, until police arrested them.
PROCEDURE: The United States indicted all five men for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846. Discontinuing further cooperation, Sugar and Stark moved to suppress the marijuana on grounds that the Missouri traffic statute that they supposedly violated only applied to roads with three or more travel lanes. The trial court agreed and ordered the evidence suppressed as to Sugar and Stark. Defendant then moved to suppress the same evidence, on grounds that using the fruits of the illegal stop violated his due process rights. The trial court ruled that the police conduct was not so egregiously illegal as all that. SUPPRESSION DENIED as to Defendant. A jury convicted Defendant as charged and the court sentenced him to 96 months. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence.
DECISION: Defendant correctly conceded that the Fourth Amendment did not help him because he was not the one searched, and the vehicle did not belong to him, so he had no standing to assert someone else's rights to be free from unreasonable search. Instead, he argued that due process under the Fifth Amendment required the evidence to be suppressed. The First Circuit held that like Fourth Amendment rights, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is personal to whoever suffered the violation of it. Trial courts may not dismiss a charge against a defendant because of an offense to a non-defendant's due process rights. No evidence of record showed that police were acting in bad faith or egregiously outside the law. Conviction and sentence AFFIRMED in all respects.
EDITORIAL: Our hero seems not to be a disciple of John Farnam, who is forever telling us not to do stupid things, go to stupid places, or associate with stupid people. Using a Lexus for a dope wagon, and loading it with bales of herb in a Holiday Inn parking lot in the middle of the day, is not what Chairman Mao would call swimming like a fish in the sea. But in the first place, somebody should have briefed Dumb and Dumberer about those "drug checkpoint and dog ahead" signs, which everybody knows are fake and are only there to get you to take that suspiciously convenient next exit, which is where the po-po's REALLY are. Notice how the opinion didn't say the fake checkpoint was wrong, just that narcs need to read the fine print in the traffic laws. Since the Fourth and Fifth amendments protect people, not places or property, this guy has six years to chill, which he will use to work up a plan to recruit brighter personnel for his next drug enterprise.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
News Flash: Kicking People To Sleep Is Generally Illegal (duh)
UNITED STATES v. PERKINS, 470 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2006), No. 05-4798, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 29297, appeal from USDC-VAED, before Circuit Judges Williams and Gregory and USDJ-WVSD Johnston sitting by designation, opinion by Williams, filed 29 Nov 2006.
LONG STORY SHORT: When a subject is lying face-down and not resisting, kicking him and stomping on his head is a felony violation of federal civil rights law, especially if the subject sustains severe injury. Binding in MD, NC, SC, VA, WV.
FACTS: Just before midnight 13 Oct 2003, Officers Tweedy and House of the Petersburg, Virginia Police Department stopped motorist Koonce to issue him a warning ticket for driving without headlights. Koonce ran away and after a lengthy foot chase Officer Tweedy finally pushed him to the ground and pepper-sprayed him. Officer House ran up and tried to handcuff Koonce, who grabbed Officer House's ankle. Officer House punched Koonce three times in the arm without result, so Officer Tweedy stomped on Koonce's head until Koonce said "all right man, all right" and let Officer House cuff his left wrist. Officer Tweedy radioed for backup and Sergeant Waldron put out the call, but Officer House radioed that the subject was under control, so Sergeant Waldron cancelled the backup call. Officer Fisher responded to the scene anyway, where Officer House asked him to secure Koonce's right arm. Officer Fisher then saw Officer Tweedy walk up to Koonce, kick him two or three times in his side, and stomp on his head three times. Koonce was now bloody and motionless when Defendant, an off-duty officer, ran up to him and kicked him twice. Finally, Officer Tweedy stomped on Koonce's head twice more, Defendant pulled him away, and Officers Fisher and House cuffed Koonce's other wrist. Koonce arrived unconscious at the hospital with multiple skull and facial fractures, punctured right lung, bruised left lung, and bleeding and contusions in the brain. On the Glasgow coma scale, he scored a 1 for mental status (eyes remained closed), 1 for verbal response (not speaking), and 3 for motor response (moved away from pain stimulus). Officer Tweedy wrote a police report claiming that Koonce had resisted and that Officer Tweedy had used no more than necessary force to control him.
PROCEDURE: Officer Tweedy pleaded guilty to violation of civil rights (here, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure) resulting in bodily injury, a felony per 18 U.S.C. § 242, and also to falsifying a police report with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, a felony per 18 U.S.C. § 1519, receiving 108 months. The United States indicted Defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. § 242. At trial, Officers House and Fisher testified that they had seen Defendant kick Koonce, demonstrated same on a use-of-force dummy, and testified about their department's UOF policy and DT training. Upon being asked whether there was any law enforcement reason for such kicking, and an overruled defense objection on grounds of ultimate issue, Officer House testified that he saw no reason for it. Officer Fisher, upon being asked whether Defendant's kicking of Koonce was in his training and experience reasonable, answered no, and further testified that other subject control techniques would have been appropriate, all without defense objection. Three other officers, one of whom was Defendant's DT instructor, all testified that the kicking was unreasonable, although they had not seen it. Defendant did not object to any of that testimony. The physician who attended Koonce at the hospital testified that blunt trauma caused the puncturing and brusing of his lungs. The trial judge instructed the jury that bodily injury, an element of the 18 U.S.C. § 242, is "a cut, abrasion, bruise, fracture, or other disfigurement, or mere physical pain, or any other injury to the body, even if not significant, severe, or permanent." The jury convicted Defendant as charged, and he got 51 months. He appealed his conviction.
DECISION: Defendant argued that allowing the five officers to testify to an opinion that Defendant's force was unreasonable, without qualifying them as expert witnesses, was error. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the three officers not at the scene should not have been allowed to offer opinion testimony without having been qualified as experts. However, since Defendant did not object to their testimony on that basis, the standard of review was the very tough "plain error" level, which it was not. Even had Defendant objected, Officers House and Fisher were eyewitnesses and did not have to be experts to offer opinions that what they saw was unreasonable. The often hairsplitting difference between legal "objective reasonableness" and dictionary "unreasonableness" was not present here, and the officers' nonexpert opinion testimony did not supplant the jury's common sense. Next, Defendant argued that he could not have caused any bodily injury because Koonce was already unconscious and incapable of feeling further pain when Defendant kicked him, and the Glasgow pain stimulus test was insufficient as a matter of law to prove pain sensitivity. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, since "bodily injury" need not be cataclysmic, just painful or impairing and only temporarily. A reasonable jury could have found from the attending physician's testimony that Defendant was the one who caused the brusing and puncturing of Koonce's lungs. Conviction and sentence AFFIRMED in all respects.
EDITORIAL: Jeez Louise, take a chill pill guys! This is one of the more off-the-chain cases I've seen, and I've seen more than some. Remember, it says "To Protect and Serve" on the car, not "To Stomp and Kick." Obviously Rafael Septien here had some preexisting issues going on, but you can get help for that, or find some other job. And then our man says even if I tried to boot him through the goalposts, that wasn't bodily injury because he was already asleep and couldn't feel it. Pray givest thou unto me a break. Yup, didn't do NOTHIN. One more reminder why I don't take criminal defense cases anymore except for officers, and if THAT officer had tried to hire me, I would have kicked HIM into next week. Also, here's another reminder that if you don't like what the other side's witness is about to say, then OBJECT for petesakes. If you make a crap sandwich at trial, it is mighty hard for us appellate lawyers to whip up enough fries and milkshakes to get two out of three appellate judges to devour the main course. I'm only a miracle worker, not a magician. Since, as part of the opinion pointed out, 18 U.S.C. § 242 is the criminal analogue of 42 U.S. § 1983, shall we even TALK about the civil settlement. And it all started with a no-headlight stop. BTW, the stupid story about gangstas killing everybody in the first car to blink their lights at them IS AN URBAN LEGEND!!! IT IS NOT TRUE! So blink away and save yourself years in prison and several Ferraris worth of civil damages.
LONG STORY SHORT: When a subject is lying face-down and not resisting, kicking him and stomping on his head is a felony violation of federal civil rights law, especially if the subject sustains severe injury. Binding in MD, NC, SC, VA, WV.
FACTS: Just before midnight 13 Oct 2003, Officers Tweedy and House of the Petersburg, Virginia Police Department stopped motorist Koonce to issue him a warning ticket for driving without headlights. Koonce ran away and after a lengthy foot chase Officer Tweedy finally pushed him to the ground and pepper-sprayed him. Officer House ran up and tried to handcuff Koonce, who grabbed Officer House's ankle. Officer House punched Koonce three times in the arm without result, so Officer Tweedy stomped on Koonce's head until Koonce said "all right man, all right" and let Officer House cuff his left wrist. Officer Tweedy radioed for backup and Sergeant Waldron put out the call, but Officer House radioed that the subject was under control, so Sergeant Waldron cancelled the backup call. Officer Fisher responded to the scene anyway, where Officer House asked him to secure Koonce's right arm. Officer Fisher then saw Officer Tweedy walk up to Koonce, kick him two or three times in his side, and stomp on his head three times. Koonce was now bloody and motionless when Defendant, an off-duty officer, ran up to him and kicked him twice. Finally, Officer Tweedy stomped on Koonce's head twice more, Defendant pulled him away, and Officers Fisher and House cuffed Koonce's other wrist. Koonce arrived unconscious at the hospital with multiple skull and facial fractures, punctured right lung, bruised left lung, and bleeding and contusions in the brain. On the Glasgow coma scale, he scored a 1 for mental status (eyes remained closed), 1 for verbal response (not speaking), and 3 for motor response (moved away from pain stimulus). Officer Tweedy wrote a police report claiming that Koonce had resisted and that Officer Tweedy had used no more than necessary force to control him.
PROCEDURE: Officer Tweedy pleaded guilty to violation of civil rights (here, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure) resulting in bodily injury, a felony per 18 U.S.C. § 242, and also to falsifying a police report with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, a felony per 18 U.S.C. § 1519, receiving 108 months. The United States indicted Defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. § 242. At trial, Officers House and Fisher testified that they had seen Defendant kick Koonce, demonstrated same on a use-of-force dummy, and testified about their department's UOF policy and DT training. Upon being asked whether there was any law enforcement reason for such kicking, and an overruled defense objection on grounds of ultimate issue, Officer House testified that he saw no reason for it. Officer Fisher, upon being asked whether Defendant's kicking of Koonce was in his training and experience reasonable, answered no, and further testified that other subject control techniques would have been appropriate, all without defense objection. Three other officers, one of whom was Defendant's DT instructor, all testified that the kicking was unreasonable, although they had not seen it. Defendant did not object to any of that testimony. The physician who attended Koonce at the hospital testified that blunt trauma caused the puncturing and brusing of his lungs. The trial judge instructed the jury that bodily injury, an element of the 18 U.S.C. § 242, is "a cut, abrasion, bruise, fracture, or other disfigurement, or mere physical pain, or any other injury to the body, even if not significant, severe, or permanent." The jury convicted Defendant as charged, and he got 51 months. He appealed his conviction.
DECISION: Defendant argued that allowing the five officers to testify to an opinion that Defendant's force was unreasonable, without qualifying them as expert witnesses, was error. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the three officers not at the scene should not have been allowed to offer opinion testimony without having been qualified as experts. However, since Defendant did not object to their testimony on that basis, the standard of review was the very tough "plain error" level, which it was not. Even had Defendant objected, Officers House and Fisher were eyewitnesses and did not have to be experts to offer opinions that what they saw was unreasonable. The often hairsplitting difference between legal "objective reasonableness" and dictionary "unreasonableness" was not present here, and the officers' nonexpert opinion testimony did not supplant the jury's common sense. Next, Defendant argued that he could not have caused any bodily injury because Koonce was already unconscious and incapable of feeling further pain when Defendant kicked him, and the Glasgow pain stimulus test was insufficient as a matter of law to prove pain sensitivity. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, since "bodily injury" need not be cataclysmic, just painful or impairing and only temporarily. A reasonable jury could have found from the attending physician's testimony that Defendant was the one who caused the brusing and puncturing of Koonce's lungs. Conviction and sentence AFFIRMED in all respects.
EDITORIAL: Jeez Louise, take a chill pill guys! This is one of the more off-the-chain cases I've seen, and I've seen more than some. Remember, it says "To Protect and Serve" on the car, not "To Stomp and Kick." Obviously Rafael Septien here had some preexisting issues going on, but you can get help for that, or find some other job. And then our man says even if I tried to boot him through the goalposts, that wasn't bodily injury because he was already asleep and couldn't feel it. Pray givest thou unto me a break. Yup, didn't do NOTHIN. One more reminder why I don't take criminal defense cases anymore except for officers, and if THAT officer had tried to hire me, I would have kicked HIM into next week. Also, here's another reminder that if you don't like what the other side's witness is about to say, then OBJECT for petesakes. If you make a crap sandwich at trial, it is mighty hard for us appellate lawyers to whip up enough fries and milkshakes to get two out of three appellate judges to devour the main course. I'm only a miracle worker, not a magician. Since, as part of the opinion pointed out, 18 U.S.C. § 242 is the criminal analogue of 42 U.S. § 1983, shall we even TALK about the civil settlement. And it all started with a no-headlight stop. BTW, the stupid story about gangstas killing everybody in the first car to blink their lights at them IS AN URBAN LEGEND!!! IT IS NOT TRUE! So blink away and save yourself years in prison and several Ferraris worth of civil damages.
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
No Knock, No Announce, No Problem When Serving Arrest Warrants
UNITED STATES v. PELLETIER, USCA-1 No. 06-1287, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 29214, appeal from USDC-MND, before Circuit Judges Selya and Howard and USDJ-RID Smith sitting by designation, opinion by Selya, decided 28 Nov 2006.
LONG STORY SHORT: The Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan that failure to knock and announce before forcing entry to serve a search warrant does not justify suppression of evidence also applies when forcing entry to a subject's home to serve an arrest warrant. Binding in MA, ME, NH, RI.
FACTS: On 30 Dec 2004 the U.S. Parole Commission issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest for violating the substance abuse terms of his parole. Officers learned that he was in Room 151 of the EconoLodge. At 0900 21 Jan 2005, officers arrived at the EconoLodge and discovered that the room was in Defendant's girlfriend's sister's name. However, a motel employee said Defendant was really the occupant. A team of officers stacked outside the door and knocked four or five times loudly in succession, without response, and 15 seconds after the first knock, the officers used a passkey to enter the room, yelling "Police!" Officers found Defendant inside, arrested him on the parole arrest warrant without resistance, and Mirandized him. In plain view were numerous drug paraphernalia, including $4,740 U.S. currency and a substance later tested to be heroin in a partially open drawer.
PROCEDURE: The United States indicted Defendant for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Defendant moved to suppress all evidence in the motel room for violating the knock-and-announce rule. Even though the U.S. conceded a failure of knock-and-announce sufficiency, the court ruled that exigent circumstances justified a no-knock entry. SUPPRESSION DENIED in all respects. Defendant pleaded guilty on condition that he could appeal the suppression issue.
DECISION: While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), in which officers serving a search warrant waited 3 to 5 seconds after knocking and announcing before forcing entry. The Supreme Court held that even though this may be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and might subject the officers to civil suit, suppression of evidence would not further the goals of the exclusionary rule, and would lead to endless argument about how long is too long to wait. The First Circuit reasoned that since an arrest warrant allows officers to force entry into the subject's home to arrest him if there is probable cause to think he is there, the situation was just like Hudson for exclusionary rule purposes. Defendant was the de facto occpant of the motel room even if it was in his girlfriend's sister's name. Since the arrest warrant was for a parole violation, Defendant had even less basis to argue violation of his rights, since parolees trade most of their rights against search and seizure in return for not having to stay in prison. Neither did Defendant challenge the validity of the parole warrant. Denial of suppression AFFIRMED in all respects.
EDITORIAL: Lotsa luck in the civil rights suit, guy. The rest of the case shows that he was quite a dope-slinger and general ne'er-do-well so he is sitting in Club Fed for the next 14 years or so. Had the police yelled "Police!" at the same time as they were knocking, there wouldn't have been any issue with not announcing. Not that I am a particular fan of giving bad guys time to come up with a resistance plan, since one of my fellow deputies got shot that way a few months ago. He's back on duty now but he does not remember that evening fondly.
LONG STORY SHORT: The Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan that failure to knock and announce before forcing entry to serve a search warrant does not justify suppression of evidence also applies when forcing entry to a subject's home to serve an arrest warrant. Binding in MA, ME, NH, RI.
FACTS: On 30 Dec 2004 the U.S. Parole Commission issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest for violating the substance abuse terms of his parole. Officers learned that he was in Room 151 of the EconoLodge. At 0900 21 Jan 2005, officers arrived at the EconoLodge and discovered that the room was in Defendant's girlfriend's sister's name. However, a motel employee said Defendant was really the occupant. A team of officers stacked outside the door and knocked four or five times loudly in succession, without response, and 15 seconds after the first knock, the officers used a passkey to enter the room, yelling "Police!" Officers found Defendant inside, arrested him on the parole arrest warrant without resistance, and Mirandized him. In plain view were numerous drug paraphernalia, including $4,740 U.S. currency and a substance later tested to be heroin in a partially open drawer.
PROCEDURE: The United States indicted Defendant for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Defendant moved to suppress all evidence in the motel room for violating the knock-and-announce rule. Even though the U.S. conceded a failure of knock-and-announce sufficiency, the court ruled that exigent circumstances justified a no-knock entry. SUPPRESSION DENIED in all respects. Defendant pleaded guilty on condition that he could appeal the suppression issue.
DECISION: While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), in which officers serving a search warrant waited 3 to 5 seconds after knocking and announcing before forcing entry. The Supreme Court held that even though this may be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and might subject the officers to civil suit, suppression of evidence would not further the goals of the exclusionary rule, and would lead to endless argument about how long is too long to wait. The First Circuit reasoned that since an arrest warrant allows officers to force entry into the subject's home to arrest him if there is probable cause to think he is there, the situation was just like Hudson for exclusionary rule purposes. Defendant was the de facto occpant of the motel room even if it was in his girlfriend's sister's name. Since the arrest warrant was for a parole violation, Defendant had even less basis to argue violation of his rights, since parolees trade most of their rights against search and seizure in return for not having to stay in prison. Neither did Defendant challenge the validity of the parole warrant. Denial of suppression AFFIRMED in all respects.
EDITORIAL: Lotsa luck in the civil rights suit, guy. The rest of the case shows that he was quite a dope-slinger and general ne'er-do-well so he is sitting in Club Fed for the next 14 years or so. Had the police yelled "Police!" at the same time as they were knocking, there wouldn't have been any issue with not announcing. Not that I am a particular fan of giving bad guys time to come up with a resistance plan, since one of my fellow deputies got shot that way a few months ago. He's back on duty now but he does not remember that evening fondly.
Hello world
At last, here's the Fourth Amendment and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act blog that after a few days you'll wonder how you ever got along without. Published semi-occasionally whenever I don't have anything better to do. Check out my homepage at www.fairdebtlawyer.com and yes I know the design sucks so I'll change it in the very near future.
The Fourth Amendment is about search and seizure, and it is the most important part of the Constitution to law enforcement officers, because they are the ones who search and seize rather often. It reads in full: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unresonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants whall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The kernel of Fourth Amendment protection is reasonableness. Searches and seizures that are so unreasonable as to violate the Fourth Amendment can get the officer in all kinds of trouble. Your department may discipline or fire you, the judge may throw out your evidence and let a dangerous criminal walk, you may get sued and have to pay a lot of money, and in extreme cases you may go to prison for years or for life. So PAY ATTENTION young Jedi, and I'll try to help you stay away from the Dark Side.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act takes up a few pages, which you can find starting at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (translation, Title 15 of the United States Code, Section 1692 and following sections). FDCPA sets rules for third-party debt collectors (usually collection agencies or collection law firms, CA for short) and provides for damages and attorney fees for collectors who get caught violating the rules. Many states, including my home drome of North Carolina, have additional fair debt collection practices laws and licensing of CAs. There are 6,000 collection agencies in the United States, many of whom are A-OK, many of whom are downright shady, and some of whom are little more than organized crime fronts. I've seen all kinds of CA shenanigans, from technical glitches in dunning letters to flat-out wire fraud and extortion. Some bad things are obviously illegal, but some bad things are only bad if you read FDCPA very carefully. The main federal watchdog agency for debt collection is the Federal Trade Commission, but FTC has A LOT to do and they can only sue two or three of the very worst FDCPA offenders every year. For the most part, it's us private consumer lawyers that make FDCPA happen. This area of law has long been obscure, but more and more lawyers are getting the word that debt collection is THE most complained-about industry that FTC keeps track of, and complaints have about doubled in just three years. I'll try to keep track of some of the more interesting FDCPA developments here.
Y'all chime in with comments and questions as often as you like. I tend to forget that not everybody has spent so many years looking at court opinions that now they read like novels to me. If the learner hasn't learned, the teacher hasn't taught.
The Fourth Amendment is about search and seizure, and it is the most important part of the Constitution to law enforcement officers, because they are the ones who search and seize rather often. It reads in full: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unresonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants whall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The kernel of Fourth Amendment protection is reasonableness. Searches and seizures that are so unreasonable as to violate the Fourth Amendment can get the officer in all kinds of trouble. Your department may discipline or fire you, the judge may throw out your evidence and let a dangerous criminal walk, you may get sued and have to pay a lot of money, and in extreme cases you may go to prison for years or for life. So PAY ATTENTION young Jedi, and I'll try to help you stay away from the Dark Side.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act takes up a few pages, which you can find starting at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (translation, Title 15 of the United States Code, Section 1692 and following sections). FDCPA sets rules for third-party debt collectors (usually collection agencies or collection law firms, CA for short) and provides for damages and attorney fees for collectors who get caught violating the rules. Many states, including my home drome of North Carolina, have additional fair debt collection practices laws and licensing of CAs. There are 6,000 collection agencies in the United States, many of whom are A-OK, many of whom are downright shady, and some of whom are little more than organized crime fronts. I've seen all kinds of CA shenanigans, from technical glitches in dunning letters to flat-out wire fraud and extortion. Some bad things are obviously illegal, but some bad things are only bad if you read FDCPA very carefully. The main federal watchdog agency for debt collection is the Federal Trade Commission, but FTC has A LOT to do and they can only sue two or three of the very worst FDCPA offenders every year. For the most part, it's us private consumer lawyers that make FDCPA happen. This area of law has long been obscure, but more and more lawyers are getting the word that debt collection is THE most complained-about industry that FTC keeps track of, and complaints have about doubled in just three years. I'll try to keep track of some of the more interesting FDCPA developments here.
Y'all chime in with comments and questions as often as you like. I tend to forget that not everybody has spent so many years looking at court opinions that now they read like novels to me. If the learner hasn't learned, the teacher hasn't taught.
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