Tuesday, June 26, 2007

Reasonable Suspicion Was Enough To Save Trooper From Million-Dollar Lawsuit

WILDER v. TURNER, USCA-10 No. 06-1092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 13728, on appeal from USDC-COD, before USCJs Kelly, Baldock, Gorsuch, opinion by Baldock, filed 12 June 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Trooper had objectively reasonable suspicion to ask a motorist who showed objective signs of alcohol consumption to take field sobriety tests, and probable cause to arrest him upon refusal; $1 million jury verdict in motorist's favor would be reversed. Binding in CO, KS, NM, OK, UT, WY.

FACTS: Defendant, a Colorado highway patrolman, stopped Plaintiff for driving 57 in a 50. Defendant smelled alcohol on Plaintiff's breath, and Plaintiff admitted he had drunk a glass of wine 10 or 15 minutes before. Defendant heard Plaintiff speak unusually slowly and deliberately, and saw that Plaintiff's face was flushed and his eyes watery. Defendant asked Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle and walk to the rear, which he did without unsteadiness. Explaining that he had observed certain indicia of intoxication, Defendant asked Plaintiff to submit to field sobriety tests, but Plaintiff declined, asking "what did I do to deserve this?" Defendant asked again for Plaintiff to submit to tests, Plaintiff refused again, and Defendant arrested Plaintiff for driving under the influence. Plaintiff disclosed that he had a licensed handgun in his car. Defendant searched the car and found on the front passenger seat a half-empty open single-serving wine bottle that Plaintiff had covered up with newspapers before stopping. Defendant charged Plaintiff with DUI and illegal possession of a weapon while intoxicated, but subsequent blood tests established Plaintiff's blood alcohol content at less than .02, well under the legal limit of .08. The criminal court dismissed all charges against Plaintiff.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiff sued Defendant in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado per 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, specifically that Defendant arrested and charged him and seized his handgun without probable cause. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that he had objective reasons for asking Plaintiff to submit to field sobriety tests, and probable cause to arrest Plaintiff upon his refusal. The trial court ruled that under Colorado Supreme Court precedent interpreting Colorado's DUI statute, Defendant had only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, of intoxication. Since under Colorado law a field sobriety test is a full search requiring probable cause, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant unlawfully seized Plaintiff. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DENIED.

A jury rendered a verdict in Defendant's favor, Plaintiff taking nothing. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for a new trial on grounds that Defendant's counsel had acted so improperly in front of the jury that the trial court was convinced that Plaintiff had not received a fair trial. Defendant renewed his summary qualified immunity motion, but the trial court denied it as late. At the second trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $1,000,000. The trial court denied all of Defendant's posttrial motions, ruling that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

DECISION: If an officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, the officer may arrest the person immediately without violating the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause is only a fair probability considering all the facts and circumstances, and needs no prima facie evidence of guilt.

Since Plaintiff sued for violation of federal law, Defendant could assert the federal defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff had to show that Defendant was liable under Fourth Amendment standards, not state law. The trial court erroneously applied state law to a federal constitutional question. Under the Fourth Amendment, a field sobriety test is a minor intrusion on a driver, and requires only reasonable suspicion of intoxication. Here, Defendant observed a moderate smell of alcohol, pinkish and watery eyes, flushed face, and unusually slow and deliberate speech and movements. These would give a reasonable officer in Defendant's place reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff for further investigation, and probable cause to arrest Plaintiff upon refusal to submit to tests. Any other rule would allow motorists to refuse cooperation and drive away, still smelling of alcohol. DENIAL OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY REVERSED; cause REMANDED for entry of judgment in Defendant's favor.

EDITORIAL: This is one of those cases where the answer is so clear, but only after somebody shows it to you. That was a brilliant analysis, and a correct result. In Section 1983 cases, it's all too easy for trial courts to get bogged down in questions of state law instead of remembering that the federal constitution governs. The confusion stems, of course, from the fact that 1983 covers state-actor violations of the constitution and laws of the United States, typically while enforcing state law. Now the state law does define the crime--but not the search and seizure related to the crime, at least not when suing under 1983. The Fourth Amendment is very often less restrictive than plaintiffs wish it were.

Good on the Colorado AG's appeal team, and fooey on the defense lawyer at the first trial who got caught ridin' dirty in the courtroom. They put everybody through a whole other trial and appeal, and left their poor trooper client under a million-dollar sword of Damocles for the year or so that it took to get the judgment reversed. Not the way to go, guys.

Monday, June 25, 2007

Necessary Roughness? Or Just The Not-So-Great Raid? 9th Circuit Backs Up The Police This Time

UNITED STATES v. ANKENY, USCA-9 No. 05-30457, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 14350, on appeal from USDC-DOR, before USCJs Reinhardt, Tashima, Graber, opinion by Graber, dissent by Reinhardt, filed 19 Jun 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Forced entry involving tactical team, battering rams, rubber bullets, flash-bangs, and over $10,000 in property damage to serve a search warrant did not have a causal relationship to the evidence found, and the Fourth Amendment did not require suppression. Binding in AK, AZ, CA, GU, HI, ID, MP, MT, OR, WA.

FACTS: Defendant's long-term girlfriend/baby-mother told Portland, Oregon police that Defendant had choked and kicked her, and that he was probably armed and using methamphetamine. Officer Rhodes ran a background check and found that Defendant had numerous convictions for drug dealing and violent crimes, and some outstanding warrants. Police decided that traffic-stopping him or arresting him on the street would be too risky to bystanders. Instead, they obtained a search warrant for the rental house where Defendant was living, and 44 officers led by the Special Emergency Response Team arrived at 0530 one morning and announced "police, search warrant" at the front door.

About one second later, officers began hitting the front door with a battering ram while others fired rubber bullets through windows, making numerous holes in walls and ceilings. As officers broke through the front door, Defendant stood up from the recliner where he had been sleeping, only to have an officer order him to show his hands and get on the floor. Another officer threw a flash-bang distraction device that detonated close enough to Defendant to cause first- and second-degree burns on his upper body. Officers threw a second flash-bang into the second story, igniting a mattress in which a couple were lying. Officers threw the mattress out the window before it could set fire to the structure.

After Defendant was in custody, officers found a 9mm pistol in the chair where Defendant had been sitting; another pistol in a chair next to him; and a sawed-off shotgun, two rifles, ammunition, drugs and paraphernalia, and $3,000 in other parts of the house. The homeowner estimated the damage inflicted by police activity would cost $14,000 to fix, but he accepted $10,000 from the city.

PROCEDURE: The United States indicted Defendant in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon for possession of firearms and ammunition while a convicted felon, and for possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence as the fruit of an unreasonable search, arguing that police had effectively failed to knock and announce before entering, and that they had used grossly excessive force, evidenced by expensive property damage and serious injury to Defendant. The trial court ruled that even though the entry was no-knock, the officers did have a warrant and would have inevitably found the evidence, making the reasonableness of the search irrelevant. MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED. Defendant pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of suppression to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

DECISION: While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006) that unauthorized no-knock entries do not justify suppression of evidence, both because of excessive social costs of suppression and the inevitability of discovering evidence whether or not officers knock and announce first. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit ruled that even if the officers did not knock or announce when searching Defendant's house, evidence would not be suppressed on that ground.

Whether the search was unreasonable was a close question. In favor of the officers' actions were the facts of Defendant's violent history and the discovery of two pistols within his reach. Reasonable officers would use surprise and considerable force to bring someone like Defendant under control before he could react, and some amount of property damage and injury could be expected. Also, the officers searched and seized no more than what the warrant authorized.

Against the officers' actions were the serious injury to Defendant and great damage to the house resulting from special weapons including two flash-bangs. However, officers would have found the weapons, ammunition, and other items whether or not they used little force or great force. The method of search had no causal connection to the discovery of the evidence. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit did not need to decide the reasonableness of the search. DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION AFFIRMED. The trial court did err in some of Defendant's convictions and sentences, which would be reversed or vacated and remanded as appropriate.

The dissent agreed that no-knock violations can no longer justify suppression, but would have held the search otherwise grossly unreasonable and would have granted suppression. The military-style invasion of Defendant's home was causally related to the discovery of evidence, and no intervening lawful search occurred to change that. Tossing two flash-bangs into occupied rooms was, without more, enough to establish unreasonableness. Officers later exchaged flippant text messages such as "fun had by all ... well except for the guy who laid on the flashbang" and "good time had by all." The social costs of suppression in this case would be well worth the deterrence value. The officers could just as well have run a reasonable, lawful search instead of an unreasonable, unlawful search, especially in the sanctity of someone's home.

EDITORIAL: I wasn't there and I'm no SWAT guy. Knowing the little that I know, I must say that if I had to serve warrants on a guy like that, I would be inclined to do about what the Portland police did here. The majority is right, as far as I can tell. And also as far as I can tell, the dissent is out to lunch on all levels. What does Judge Reinhardt want the police to do--give the violent woman-battering bad guys a fair chance to fight back? What does Judge Reinhardt know about proper deployment of flash-bangs? Who is to blame for giving this lefty a platform for inflicting such judicial buffoonery upon thinking people since 1980? Answers: sure looks like it, obviously nothing, and Jimmy Carter (who else?). This is not the first or last flat-out anti-police pro-criminal opinion from Judge Reinhardt, who has won numerous awards from criminal defense and plaintiff lawyer groups. You don't get those for being conservative. Remember, I am a former criminal defender and current consumer advocate, so I know.

Hey, did you notice something else? The bad guy was indeed so surprised and overwhelmed that he didn't even have time or thought to reach for his guns. No police officers or innocent people got hurt at all. I guess the bad guy can sue for his second-degree burns, but it's a classic case of "better judged by 12 than carried by 6." Do try to resist the urge for funny texts, though. The "judged by 12" part may go easier.

Sunday, June 24, 2007

SCOTUS: Brief Nudity For Officer Safety's Sake Is Permissible During High-Risk Warrant Service

LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. RETTELE, SCOTUS No. 06-605, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5900, on writ of certiorari to USCA-9, opinion per curiam, concurrence by Stevens, dissent from grant of certiorari by Souter, filed 21 May 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Officers who mistakenly served a search warrant on the wrong house could order a naked couple out of bed and not allow them to dress for two minutes until officers determined that the couple had no weapons within reach. Binding in the United States.

FACTS: Defendant, a deputy of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, investigated a fraud and identity theft ring and developed four African-American suspects, one of whom was the registered owner of a 9mm Glock pistol. Defendant researched many records to find where the suspects lived, and obtained search warrants for two houses and arrest warrants for three suspects. Defendant did not discover that three months before, one of the houses had been sold to Plaintiffs, an unmarried heterosexual couple who lived there with the woman's 17-year-old son. All of them were Caucasian-American.

Defendant and six other deputies knocked and announced at 0715 one morning, and the 17-year-old answered. The deputies ordered him to the floor and entered Plaintiffs' bedroom. Despite Plaintiffs' pleas that they were naked, the deputies ordered them out of bed at gunpoint and did not let them get dressed for one or two minutes while the deputies determined that no immediate threat was present. Then the deputies allowed Plaintiffs to dress, after which they sat down in the living room for about four minutes. By this time, the deputies had determined they had made a mistake, apologized profusely, and departed to search the other house on the warrant, where they found and arrested the three suspects.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiffs, for themselves and as guardian ad litem for the 17-year-old, sued Defendant and others in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California per 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, among other causes, unreasonable search and detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The trial court ruled that the search warrant was valid and properly obtained and that the search and detention were not unreasonable, and in the alternative, that it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in Defendant's position that he was violating the Constitution. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GRANTED.

Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which noted that even though the warrant was valid, the fact of Plaintiffs being white and the suspects being black was immediate proof of a mistake. A reasonable jury could find that Defendant knowingly violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by holding them at gunpoint naked when they were clearly not the suspects on the warrant. GRANT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY REVERSED. Defendant petitioned for and received a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.

DECISION: Probable cause to obtain a warrant is far from absolute certainty, and in an imperfect world, the perfectly innocent will sometimes get searched under a valid warrant. Courts will not punish officers for reasonably executing a mistaken warrant. A reasonable officer in our diverse society, even though searching for African-American subjects, will wisely account for the possibility that Caucasian-Americans may be working with them. Particularly when Defendant and the other deputies knew one of the subjects of the warrant to be armed, they had to assume that anyone in the house might be armed and of a mind to resist.

In executing a search warrant, officers may take objectively reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search. To these ends, officers may detain all persons on the premises while conducting a proper search. Objectively unreasonable actions include excessive force or restraints that cause unnecessary pain or last too long. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has approved of subjects being handcuffed for up to three hours during a search.

Holding naked citizens at gunpoint is not to be done lightly, but here, the Supreme Court ruled that this was reasonable and perhaps necessary. Some criminals keep guns and other weapons under pillows and in bedclothes, meaning that officers need not turn their backs for modesty's sake, but instead should take total control of the situation until a threat-free environment is established. Here, Plaintiffs were in this extremely awkward state for at most two minutes, after which the deputies allowed, indeed urged, them to get dressed. Defendant did not act as an unreasonable officer would have done, did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and was entitled to qualified immunity. REVERSED AND REMANDED for further consistent proceedings.

Justice Souter would have denied certiorari.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment, but would have reversed the Ninth Circuit on grounds that Plaintiffs' rights were not clearly established, and thereby avoided directly ruling whether Defendant's conduct was constitutional.

EDITORIAL: This would make a perfect Southwest Airlines "Wanna get away?" commercial--on both sides. Not funny at all to the poor undraped bemused couple, though. I'm sure the deputies in question now check very thoroughly as to who owns the house they'd like to search. I agree with the result, and I can only imagine the relief of the deputies as they found out they won the Supreme Lottery by being the less that 1% of cert petitions that get granted.

I don't agree with the concurrence, which is the latest hint of a movement among the Powers that Be to do away with the first half of the qualified immunity test. The traditional Constitutional Two-Step goes: first, did the police violate the Constitution, and second, would reasonable officers in that situation have known they were violating the Constitution? Sounds just peachy to me, but some are saying that if you can get rid of the case by doing the second step first, then don't bother with the first part. I am not alone in saying that you can't clearly establish violations (second step) without some caselaw that decides what is a violation (only comes from doing the first step as often as possible). Would somebody explain why we should now begin to wander around in an ever-deepening constitutional swamp of "not clearly a violation" instead of deciding the law when we need to?

SCOTUS: Seize A Car, Seize Everybody In It

BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA, SCOTUS No. 06-8120, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 7897, on writ of certiorari to CA, opinion by Justice Souter, filed 18 Jun 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: When an officer stops a vehicle, everyone in it is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and any passenger or driver has standing to challenge the stop. Binding in the United States.

FACTS: Deputy Brokenbrough drove by a parked car and noticed that the registration had expired, but learned from dispatch that the owner had applied for renewal. Later in the shift, Deputy Brokenbrough saw the same car on the road, displaying an apparently valid temporary operating permit. There was nothing unusual about the permit or its display, but Deputy Brokenbrough decided to stop the car and see if the permit matched it.

While checking the driver's license, Deputy Brokenbrough noticed that the passenger was Defendant, whom he believed to be a parole violator. Deputy Brokenbrough checked with dispatch again and verified that Defendant had a warrant for parole violations. After calling for backup, he arrested Defendant and found a syringe cap on him. Patdown of the driver produced green leafy substance and syringes, for which she was arrested. Search of the car incident to arrest discovered items used for methamphetamine production.

PROCEDURE: California charged Defendant with possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence from the search incident to arrest, arguing that no reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop, and consequently the seizure of his person was unreasonable and illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court ruled that the stop was legal and that Defendant was not seized until Deputy Brokenbrough ordered him out of the car and arrested him. MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED. Defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years, reserving his right to appeal the denial of suppression.

Defendant appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which ruled the stop illegal and also held that Defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes at the time of the stop. DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION REVERSED. California appealed to the Supreme Court of California, conceding that the stop was illegal, but arguing that Defendant, as a passenger and not the driver, was not seized. The Supreme Court of California ruled that the driver was the exclusive target of the traffic stop, and not only did Defendant have no ability to submit to Deputy Brokenbrough's authority, but also he could have walked away and gone about his business as soon as the car stopped. Consequently, Defendant was never seized. REVERSAL OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION REVERSED. Defendant petitioned for and received a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.

DECISION: A person is seized, and thereby entitled to challenge the seizure, under the Fourth Amendment when an officer of the government terminates or restrains the person's freedom of movement by means of physical force or show of authority, through means intentionally applied. Accidental collisions are not seizures. Persons who do not submit to authority or force are not seized. In ambiguous situations, a seizure occurred if a reasonable person, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, would not have felt free to leave.

Without question, the driver of a traffic-stopped vehicle has submitted to authority and has been seized. However, the Supreme Court had never directly answered the question of whether the passengers of that vehicle have also been seized. Contrary to the California high court's decision, the Supreme Court held that reasonable passengers in a stopped vehicle do not feel free to leave. Driver and passengers alike have been diverted from the stream of traffic and subjected to police scrutiny, presumably because of the driver's wrongdoing, but possibly because of a passenger's action, e.g., not wearing a seat belt. Reasonable passengers will consider themselves at least suspicious by close association, and would expect the stopping officer to object to their leaving without explanation.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that officers at a traffic stop may, for officer safety reasons and without reasonable suspicion, order vehicle occupants to remain inside or to get out at the officers' discretion. These rulings have built a societal expectation that everybody in a stopped vehicle, at least a small vehicle as opposed to a bus, must obey the officer or else. Defendant submitted to Deputy Brokenbrough's authority by remaining in the car and not running away.

Here, California conceded that no reasonable suspicion supported the stop, since the car's operating permit appeared to be valid and properly displayed. Defendant's seizure began not with his arrest, but from the moment of the vehicle stop. Defendant's seizure was, to that extent, unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Any contrary policy would encourage police to stop vehicles illegally and seize passengers, knowing the passengers could not challenge police actions. VACATED AND REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing.

EDITORIAL: I suppose I have to agree. This was a unanimous decision, meaning that even Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and the Dread Chief Justice Roberts ("I Am Here For Your Soooouuul") went along. But all you have to do, as ever, is follow the vehicle around until the driver DOES commit a definite, substantial, and clear-cut traffic infraction. This will happen sooner rather than later if the occupants are suffering from a guilty conscience and then see that a nice policeman is riding their bumper, at a safe distance of course.

Tuesday, June 12, 2007

"Gone In Sixty Seconds" Scam Is OK This Once, But Not Necessarily Ideal

UNITED STATES v. ALVEREZ-TEJADA, USCA-9 No. 06-30289, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 13378, on appeal from USDC-WAED, before USCJs Kozinski, Fisher, Tallman, opinion by Kozinski, concurrence by Fisher, filed 08 Jun 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Police-staged accident and theft of suspect's vehicle, leading to discovery of controlled substances, was not outrageous enough to require suppression, but was not a recommended procedure. Binding in AK, AZ, CA, GU, HI, ID, MP, MT, OR, WA.

FACTS: DEA agents developed information indicating that the leader of a drug conspiracy was letting Defendant use his car to transport illegal drugs. Undercover officers had bought drugs from persons in that car, and on the day in question, surveillance and intercepted phone calls gave police probable cause to believe contraband was in it. DEA and local police in eastern Washington State decided to stage an incident to gain access to the car Defendant was driving.

An officer pretending to be a drunk truck driver lightly bumped the car from behind at a traffic light while Defendant and his girlfriend were in it. The car sustained no damage and Defendant and Girlfriend were totally uninjured. Local officers arrested the truck driver for DWI while other officers told Defendant and Girlfriend to park in a parking lot and leave the keys in the car. When Defendant and Girlfriend got into a police car for processing, another officer pretending to be a car thief drove off in their car, with marked units in pursuit. Police told Defendant and Girlfriend that their car had gotten away, and dropped them off at a hotel. In fact, police were obtaining a search warrant, and when the warrant issued, police found cocaine and methamphetamine in the car Defendant had been driving. Later, police returned some of Defendant's and Girlfriend's property to them, claimed that the thief had thrown the items out of the window during the pursuit.

PROCEDURE: The United States indicted Defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington [Note: the opinion does not say what exactly he was indicted for]. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence from the car as the fruit of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court ruled that the government's conduct was outrageous and unconstitutional. MOTION TO SUPPRESS GRANTED. The United States took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

DECISION: Defendant agreed that the police could lawfully have seized the car under civil forfeiture statutes without a warrant, because the police had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. Defendant's complaint was that the method of seizure was unreasonable, and reasonableness is the benchmark of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit, after careful consideration of all the circumstances, could not conclude that the government's conduct was unreasonable.

Courts accept that police may and must run some operations undercover. Here, the police needed to keep their operation secret, and also had the lawful power to seize the car, so it was not a case of officers using deception to get to a place where they had no right to be. Neither did police use excessive force, only a light tap on the bumper sufficient to get Defendant's attention and get him out of the car. The staged chase was perhaps not the safest thing to do, but Defendant could not assert others' rights to be free from government-created danger absent a showing of extreme, outrageous, or shocking behavior, which he could not do. About the only stress that Defendant experienced was that of any car theft victim, although the Ninth Circuit estimated that what really alarmed him was having to face his boss after losing all those drugs in the car. GRANT OF SUPPRESSION REVERSED; cause REMANDED for further proceedings.

The concurrence expressed considerable concern about the unorthodox police conduct here, particularly that it involved the apparently innocent girlfriend. The ruse was definitely pushing the envelope, and should not become a model for future police action.

EDITORIAL: Which means that every narc who hears about this case will now want to go out and try it themselves. Maybe they should, especially seeing as how the guy had no chance or occasion to fight back or deploy weapons. I don't see how a staged pursuit can be terribly dangerous if all vehicles involved obey all traffic laws. There's nothing illegal or dangerous about two vehicles in a convoy going below the speed limit and stopping for all red lights, even if one of them happens to have emergency lights and sirens on. OJ led a slooow chase; why can't everybody? The only part I don't like is that the guy's girlfriend was in the car. This case, instead of pushing the envelope, is instead a great example of thinking out of the box.

Good Thing The Waterbed Caught Fire Before The Fireworks Did

Blog 2007-05-25

UNITED STATES v. BUCKMASTER, USCA-6 No. 06-3954, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 10776, on appeal from USDC-OHND, before USCJs Merritt, Martin, USDJ-KYED Forester by designation, opinion by Martin, filed 07 May 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Burning waterbed in a home required firefighter intervention, and the public safety exception made the firefighters’ discovery of unlicensed explosives reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Binding in KY, OH, TN, WI.

FACTS: Firefighters of Madison Township, Ohio responded to a fire at Defendant’s three-story home and evacuated everyone there, then went inside and put out the fire. Firefighters could see that the fire originated in the wooden headboard of Defendant’s waterbed on the top floor, and by the time the fire was extinguished, fragments from a broken mirror on the headboard had punctured the mattress. Meanwhile, fire investigator Sergeant Byers of the Madison PD who knew of a history of complaints regarding Defendant setting off fireworks, arrived and asked Defendant if there were any fireworks in the house. When Defendant admitted so, Sergeant Byers and Investigator Perko of the fire department went inside to investigate the nature and origin of the fire. By this time, large vent fans were in place and running to clear the air, and the firefighters on the top and middle floors had already removed their breathing apparatus, indicating that they did not think there was any immediate carbon monoxide danger.

Water from the waterbed was still not contained, so the investigators began checking the rest of the house for carbon monoxide and for spilled water that could cause structural damage and electrical short circuits. When they got to the basement, the investigators saw water raining from the ceiling and pouring out of outlets, requiring tarps to control flooding and the utilities to be turned off. Investigators also noticed in plain view boxes marked 1.3G and 1.4G containing 1,250 pounds of commercial-grade fireworks sitting ten feet from the furnace.

PROCEDURE: The United States indicted Defendant in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for unlicensed 1.3G fireworks and improperly storing 1.4G fireworks. Defendant moved to suppress the fireworks, arguing that their discovery was a pretextual search for suspected fireworks, and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given that the fire originated on the top floor and was already out when the investigators entered his basement without a search warrant. MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED. Defendant pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of suppression to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

DECISION: For obvious reasons, firefighters may constitutionally enter burning buildings by force, without warrants, consent, or announcement. Firefighters may also stay until the fire is out and they are satisfied that it will not restart, and to investigate the cause. Once they have learned the fire’s cause and origin and determined that people may safely reenter, further investigation of the rest of the premises requires probable cause and a search warrant.

Here, firefighters had two concerns—water damage including electrical short circuits that could start another fire, and carbon monoxide pockets. The firefighters and investigators acted very reasonably in controlling these dangers before letting Defendant back inside. Whether or not the firefighters and investigators might also have been keeping an eye out for illegal fireworks was irrelevant. The Sixth Circuit cautioned that this opinion was not a future license to search all through a house just because of a carbon monoxide hazard, especially where, as here, large vent fans were blowing and the firefighters above the basement were no longer wearing air packs. However, since there was also a water danger and the investigators had made no more than a brief sweep of the basement when they happened to see fireworks in plain view, no Fourth Amendment problems occurred here. DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION AFFIRMED.

EDITORIAL: This sounds like something that should have happened in South Carolina! 1.3G explosives, according to the American Pyrotechnic Association, used to be called Class B special fireworks, which need licenses to possess and are for commercial displays, not for amateurs to be keeping in basements. 1.4G explosives ARE the normal amateur-type fireworks, but you still have to store them safely. This guy had 1,250 pounds of them. That's a lot of fireworks to be keeping unsecured in the basement. He got a whole year in Club Fed for that--might be fair.

The rule we usually hear about warrantless fire investigations is that you better get them done before the firetruck leaves. This was a good use of that rule. I'll leave the carbon monoxide explorations to the professionals, thank you.

Thursday, June 7, 2007

But Defending Yourself Against Aggravated Assault Is Legal And NOT Suable

DELEON v. CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, USCA-5 No. 05-41301, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 12640, on appeal from USDC-TXSD, before Chief USCJ Jones, USCJs Higginbotham, Clement, opinion by Higginbotham, filed 31 May 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Plaintiff's deferred adjudication for aggravated assault amounted to a conviction that prevented him from suing the officer who shot him during the incident. Binding in LA, MS, TX.

FACTS: [Note: This is only the plaintiff's side of things.] Plaintiff's wife called the police during an argument with Plaintiff. Defendant, an officer of the Corpus Christi, TX PD, responded to their house, by which time they had calmed down. Defendant insisted that Plaintiff leave the house, and when Plaintiff protested, Defendant sprayed mace [Note: "Mace" is a registered trademark of Mace Security International, Inc., one of many manufacturers of OC aerosol sprays for defense and LE; wish people would quit calling all sprays "mace"] in Plaintiff's face and swung a baton at him. Plaintiff defended himself by grabbing Defendant's baton, and they struggled with the baton until Plaintiff's wife took it away. The fight carried all three to the kitchen, where Plaintiff got Defendant in a bear hug but then let him go and backed up against the pantry door, clearly unarmed and hands raised. Plaintiff's two-year-old was by his knee, and Plaintiff's wife was between him and Defendant, who drew his pistol. As Plaintiff asked "are you going to shoot me?" Defendant did so, four times.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiff was charged with the Texas offense of aggravated assault of a police officer. He pleaded guilty, and after the judge heard evidence including Plaintiff's sworn confession, decided to defer adjudication, meaning that if Plaintiff followed the terms of his community supervision, eventually the charge would be dismissed.

Plaintiff sued Defendant in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas per 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for illegal search and seizure and use of excessive force. [Note: The opinion did not specify Fourth Amendment, but that's what it has to be.] Defendant moved to dismiss per Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing that Plaintiff's deferred adjudication for aggravated assault was the same as a conviction for purposes of suing for excessive force. The trial court ruled that the deferred adjudication meant that Plaintiff in fact did commit aggravated assault against Defendant, and allowing Plaintiff to sue for Defendant's use of force would impugn the validity of Plaintiff's conviction. MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED, WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

DECISION: Texas statute requires criminal trial judges to hear evidence and find that it substantiates the defendant's guilt before deciding to defer adjudication and place the defendant on community supervision. This means that a Texas deferred adjudication is not just a conviction in name only; it is a judicial finding of fact that the defendant really did the offense. SCOTUS precedent requires that any subsequent civil suit must respect the result of a prior conviction unless and until the conviction gets reversed on appeal, vacated by habeas corpus or executive pardon, or expunged. This is the "favorable termination doctrine" of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

There are two ways of looking at this requirement, and the Circuits are split over them. One is that Heck should apply only when habeas corpus is not available to the would-be plaintiff. The other, which prevails in the Fifth Circuit, is that Heck reflects the tort law as of 1871 when Section 1983 was enacted, which was that tort actions are not the proper and logical way of attacking criminal convictions. Under this rule, a Texas deferred adjudication is a conviction for Heck purposes because it requires a judicial finding that the defendant committed the crime, even if there is no adjudication of guilt yet. Whether Plaintiff could sue AFTER dismissal of his charge was not a question yet, and remained undecided.

Neither could Plaintiff claim that Defendant used excessive force after the need for doing so had passed, because the whole incident here was one continuous transaction. Defendant's use of force was inseparable from Plaintiff's alleged defense against it. Plaintiff's civil complaint contradicted his sworn confession in Texas criminal court and could not stand against it. However, Plaintiff correctly argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his case simply "with prejudice" when it should have dismissed with leave to refile if and when Plaintiff met Heck conditions, and the trial court would be ordered to modify the judgment accordingly. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

EDITORIAL: "I didn't do NOTHIN and this mean cop just busted up in my house and pepper-sprayed me and whooped on me with a baton, and then SHOT me for NO REASON AT ALL right in front of my wife and kid." eeeyup. You're sure you didn't do NOTHIN even though you swore out a confession to doing NOTHIN? "Well maybe I DID do NOTHIN but it was in self-defense." okeydoke.

Guys, this is why the Constitution gives you the right to trial by jury. If indeed you didn't do NOTHIN--or if, in the alternative, you didn't DO nothin--or if, in an abundance of caution, you didn't do nothin WRONG--then go to trial and the jury will agree with you. At absolute worst, cop an Alford plea and make some kind of record that you STILL don't think you did nothin even though you are sort of admitting to it.

Once again, this is an appeal from an early stage of the case where the officer didn't yet have his chance to tell his side of the facts. The courts, in a motion to dismiss, have to take all but the totally impossibly stupidest things in a complaint as true. It's not the plaintiff's lawyer's job to be FAIR or to tell the whole story. Here, I suspect that a whole lotta story got left out, such as what exactly inspired the officer to shoot the guy in front of his wife and kid. Dollars to donuts, there was some pretty fine reason to do so--if in fact it really was in front of his wife and kid--which begs the question, why were YOU pounding on a cop in front of your wife and kid anyway?

Again, will everybody quit calling all defensive sprays "Mace"! To me, the term implies the old-timey CS/CN tear gas joke of a spray, which is Glade Air Freshener compared to OC pepper spray. Mace Security International has indeed gotten the memo about that, and mostly sells pepper spray. I like the ASP (why didn't they call the baton an "asp" so long as we're overapplying registered trademarks?) low-profile keychain/kubotan-looking dealie myself.

Good show to appellate lawyer Nancy M. Simonson of Canales & Simonson, Corpus Christi. She killed the dragon before it got out of its cave, and that's what civil defense law is all about.