Thursday, May 10, 2007

Collector Suggests Profitable Group Sex

I cannot make this stuff up. Yesterday, in a case against an extremely shady and slimy agency (I have them on tape committing many violations), I was conferring with a manager who gave me a fake name and copped the usual attitude that THEIR holy firm could NEVER have done ANYthing wrong. He also said he was going to turn in a 1099-C to IRS for the amount of the (nonexistent) debt (which according to one rep was an Aspire Visa, and another rep was a College Classic Visa), whereupon I indicated that this would be illegal, and did I mention that I happen to hold a master's in taxation, so don't try that again. Eventually, it became clear to him that I was not going away, and that not only would he never collect any money from us, he would furthermore be giving up money TO us for violating about a thousand debt collection laws.

So he said, "you'd make a lot more money if you got in bed with us."

eeeeewww.

Dear readers, who doth know me so well, I leave it to you to pick which one of the following entirely appropriate responses I actually said.

(a) I just threw up in my mouth a little bit.
(b) It's very sweet of you to offer, but I'm waiting for marriage.
(c) I sleep quite well doing what I do already, thank you.
(d) Sorry, I already have numerous girlfriends, and I must stay faithful to all of them.

I think he got the message.

The call ended with my indication that there seemed to be nothing left to do but sue. He wished me good luck with the worthless default judgment I would get. As I was explaining how I collected the last default judgment from a collector--in full--after he wasted a few thousand bucks on a big stuffy law firm that never had any chance against ME--he hung up. Oh well, he'll find out all about it soon enough

Wednesday, May 9, 2007

Don't Lie In Court, Don't Lie To Consumers' Lawyers: Wolpoff & Abramson Gets Another Pie In The Face

SAYYED v. WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, USCA-4 No. 06-1458, http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/dailyopinions/opinion.pdf/061458.P.pdf , on appeal from USDC-DMD, before Chief USCJ Wilkins, USCJs Wilkinson, Motz, opinion by Wilkinson, filed 09 May 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Debt collectors' false statements in court papers and false statements to consumers' counsel are violations of FDCPA, which overrides any common-law litigation immunity. Binding in MD, NC, SC, VA, WV.

FACTS: Wolpoff & Abramson, a collection law firm [Note: NOT! They are a lawyer-owned collection agency, not a law firm as respectable folk understand the term, because most of their collectors are rude, insolent, unprofessional NONlawyers who call up and demand payment, typically violating FDCPA any way they can for a buck. This case is a relatively rare one in which Wolpoff & Abramson actually sued somebody--but as will be seen, perhaps they should not have.], sued Plaintiff in Maryland state court for an alleged Discover Bank credit card on which Plaintiff allegedly defaulted.

Wolpoff & Abramson served interrogatories on Plaintiff that failed to disclose that they were communications from a debt collector. The interrogatories also falsely stated the court date, did not inform Plaintiff that any denials had to be under oath in order to be effective, and did not disclose that the state court could default Plaintiff if he did not serve answers within 30 days. Wolpoff & Abramson moved for summary judgment against Plaintiff, who claimed that the written motion misstated the amount of the debt, and also tried to collect 15% attorney fees that Wolpoff & Abramson was not entitled to.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiff filed a counterclaim in that case [Note: it's not clear from the opinion what he was claiming], whereupon Discover Bank fired Wolpoff & Abramson from the case, obtained new counsel, and settled with Plaintiff. Plaintiff also sued Wolpoff & Abramson in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland for violating the following provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) forbidding false statement of the amount of the debt in Wolpoff & Abramson's summary judgment motion; §§ 1692e(2)(B) and 1692f(1) forbidding collection of unauthorized attorney fees; § 1692e(10) forbidding misrepresentations, including the false trial date, the nondisclosure that interrogatory answers had to be under oath, and the failure to warn that Plaintiff could be defaulted for not serving answers within 30 days; and § 1692e(11) requiring that the interrogatories disclose that they were communications from a debt collector.

Wolpoff & Abramson moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim per Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that attorneys enjoy absolute immunity to suit for statements made in the course of litigation; Wolpoff & Abramson served the interrogatories not on Plaintiff directly, but on Plaintiff's counsel, whom FDCPA did not protect; and that any false statements in the summary judgment motion stemmed from reasonable reliance on their clients' representations. Taking all of Plaintiff's statements as true for purposes of the motion, the trial court mentioned "witness immunity" and ruled that absolute common law immunity protected Wolpoff & Abramson from any claims based on statements made in litigation, and that a 15% attorney fee was reasonable, then went on to state that commercial litigation could not proceed if FDCPA were applicable to cases like these. MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; case closed. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

DECISION: Wolpoff & Abramson is definitely a "debt collector" under FDCPA and must obey it, even in the course of litigation. Wolpoff & Abramson was essentially arguing for absolute immunity in disregard of FDCPA's plain language. This the Fourth Circuit could not do. Congress wrote no blanket FDCPA exception for debt collection attorneys' litigation activities and the Supreme Court has refused to read any such exception into it. Congress did amend FDCPA to exempt formal pleadings § 1692(11), but not from the rest of FDCPA.

Neither is there any exception for communications to a consumer's counsel, because "communications" are "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." Again, the Supreme Court has read no exception into "indirectly" that would immunize communications to counsel. Wolpoff & Abramson further argued [Note: it's not clear from the opinion whether the trial court ruled on this] that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute under which people can sue government officials for violating the U.S. Constitution or federal laws, preserves common-law immunities for such officials, and therefore FDCPA does the same for debt collectors. The Fourth Circuit found flaws in that analogy, partly that Wolpoff & Abramson identified no immunity that would have protected them in this case, but mostly because § 1983 is a bare-bones paragraph from the Reconstruction era, while FDCPA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme meant to overwrite, not incorporate, the common law.

The trial court's concern that commercial litigation could not proceed if FDCPA applied to court proceedings was misplaced. This was a consumer collection case, not a commercial one. Neither did the case have anything to do with witness immunity. Plaintiff sued over false statements in Wolpoff & Abramson's summary judgment motion, not in the affidavits attached to it, and if Plaintiff could prove that violation, he could recover under FDCPA. Wolpoff & Abramson could still avoid liability by proving the statements true, or by proving the good faith error defense per § 1692k(c), but that was not a matter suitable for resolution on motion to dismiss. Lastly, neither side had fully briefed or argued two of Plaintiff's claims--unauthorized attorney fees and nondisclosure that the interrogatories were from a debt collector--so the Fourth Circuit expressed no opinion on them. The trial court needed to consider them in the light of this opinion. DISMISSAL REVERSED; cause remanded for further proceedings.

EDITORIAL: The hooligans of Wolpoff & Abramson take a well-deserved pimp-slap from Richmond! Tell the truth--what's so hard about that? Write "This is from a debt collector. This is an attempt to collect a debt." in the footer of every page--what's so hard about that? Put down the right court date--what's so hard about that? Now Wolpoff & Abramson is on notice that courts will not tolerate their shenanigans on grounds that, well, it was in court so we can do anything we want. Great decision, Fourth Circuit! Ernest P. Francis of Arlington, who won this appeal, is hereby awarded the FDCPA Blog Legion of Merit. Good show, Ernest. Wolpoff & Abramson's only comfort is, oh, the 8 kazillion dollars a day they make from unsuspecting consumers who don't know they're being illegally stomped on.

Wolpoff & Abramson: Don't lie to ME again. You are warned.

Second Amendment Update: DC Circuit Denies En Banc Hearing (translation: good news!)

After the Parker v. District of Columbia decision came down firmly in favor of an individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Mayor Fenty and his fellow professional gun haters requested that all ten judges of the D.C. Circuit review the three-judge panel's decision. This is officially called a petition for rehearing en banc, and it's the only way to get a panel decision reversed, other than going to the Supreme Court. Also, an en banc decision can recede from (translation: change the court's mind) prior panel decisions. Appellate courts hardly ever grant these requests, and this one was no exception. The D.C. Circuit voted 6-4 to leave the panel opinion standing.

Those voting to secure our Second Amendment rights were Circuit Judges Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Brown, Griffith, and Kavanaugh. Those voting to put our Second Amendment rights in jeopardy were Circuit Judges Randolph, Rogers, Tatel, and Garland.

Now that the collective brain of the D.C. Circuit has come to its senses about constitutional plain language, not to mention the District of Columbia's willful idiocy of denying arms to the law-abiding while criminals buy or steal any weapon they want, the only thing Fenty and Comrades can do is to take it to the Supremes. I'm not sure whether we should want that or not. True, the Supremes commonsensically ruled the ban on revolting partial-birth abortions constitutional--but before that, they nonsensically let their religious belief in global warming dictate their ruling in the EPA case. Wish we could wait and see if Justice Stevens retires before Bush 43 has to. As the Capital Steps' parody of that West Side Story song goes--"Scaliaaaah! Oh, give me just one more Scalia!"

Tuesday, May 8, 2007

Officer Jerk Would Rather Arrest People Than Move His Car, For Which He'll Pay

SKOP v. CITY OF ATLANTA, USCA-11 No. 06-14294, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 10341, on appeal from USDC-GAND, before USCJs Hull, Marcus, U.S. Court of International Trade Judge Barzilay by designation, opinion by Marcus, filed 03 May 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: When a citizen reasonably requested an officer to move his car so that she could enter her own driveway, the officer then illegally arrested her without probable cause and would be denied pretrial qualified immunity. Binding in AL, FL, GA.

FACTS: Defendant, an Atlanta PD officer, was doing some paperwork and observing the scene while parked in his patrol car on a residential street where an afternoon thunderstorm had knocked down a large tree 110 feet away from him. At the other end of the block were some downed power lines. Plaintiff drove home from work and saw that the rear quarter of Defendant's patrol car was blocking her driveway. Defendant did not respond to her turn signal or horn. Plaintiff walked up to Defendant's window and tapped, whereupon Defendant lowered the window and yelled that Plaintiff was in a dangerous area. Defendant closed his window before Plaintiff had a chance to ask him to move his car a little bit. Plaintiff tapped again, with the same result. Defendant later testified that he told Plaintiff to park her car at the curb and walk to her house, but Plaintiff never heard him say that, and if he had said it, Plaintiff would have obeyed.

Plaintiff mouthed a request for Defendant's name and badge number, and at last Defendant jumped out of his patrol car. As Plaintiff explained that this was her home and Defendant only needed to move up a foot, Defendant threatened "Do you realize I can arrest you for obstruction?" and then did exactly that, as Plaintiff called for help from a neighbor. Defendant cuffed Plaintiff and installed her in the back of his patrol car. While he was awaiting a tow truck to impound Plaintiff's car (and refused to let a neighbor take custody of her car), Defendant kept yelling at Plaintiff, claiming she had obstructed him. Defendant also conferred with the shift sergeant, who suggested that Defendant also charge Plaintiff with refusing to obey an officer directing traffic. Another neighbor approached Defendant to ask about Plaintiff's abandoned car, and Defendant said "I may arrest you next." Defendant later admitted that he had the discretion to let Plaintiff go with a citation, but that he believed it was in his own self-interest to keep her under arrest for departmental liability reasons.

When the tow truck arrived, Defendant pulled his patrol car into Plaintiff's driveway--though he would later testify that he believed it was unsafe for Plaintiff to pull her own car into the same spot--and then took Plaintiff to jail, where she stayed until 3:00 in the morning. Charges were dropped over a year later, but Plaintiff lost her job because of the arrest record. Plaintiff suffered two herniated disks and a torn rotator cuff from being restrained during arrest. Atlanta PD investigated the incident and suspended Defendant for two days without pay, and entered a written reprimand against him for abusing his authority as to Plaintiff, and another written reprimand for discourtesy to the neighbor whom he had threatened to arrest.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiff sued Defendant, his supervisor, and Atlanta in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia per 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting her without probable cause and for malicious prosecution, violating the Fourth Amendment. After discovery and mediation, Defendant moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction and failure to obey. The trial court agreed, finding that Defendant did not know he was blocking Plaintiff's driveway, and also found no basis for any claim that Defendant and his supervisor had conspired to suggest the failure to obey charge in order to cover lack of probable cause for obstruction. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GRANTED; case dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

DECISION: The first step in qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether there was some constitutional violation. Arresting someone without probable cause is illegal, but not suable if the officer made a good faith mistake. The Georgia obstruction statute requires willful obstruction of a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties. Here, far from obstructing Defendant, Plaintiff was only asking Defendant to discharge his duties, to wit, assisting stranded motorists. Defendant's claim that Plaintiff's request to help, made politely and not while Defendant was in a threatening situation, amounted to obstruction was utterly devoid of merit and without foundation in the law. Plaintiff's criticism of Defendant was classic First Amendment protected speech and as a matter of law was not a crime. No probable cause or arguable probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction.

Failing to obey the order of an officer directing traffic was a matter still in factual dispute. Plaintiff said she never heard Defendant tell her to park her car and walk, which a jury could credit as evidence that Defendant in fact never told her any such thing but instead later concocted it as a defense. Defendant's claim that he arrested her to protect her from going down the block toward the downed power lines was inconsistent with his claim that he told her to park her car and walk down the block--toward the downed power lines. A reasonable jury could find that Defendant had no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for failing to obey traffic directions.

The second part of qualified immunity analysis is whether a reasonable officer in Defendant's place would have recognized that his conduct was violating the Constitution. Arresting someone without arguable probable cause is illegal according to clearly established law. Also, such an arrest will support a claim for unconstitutional malicious prosecution in the Eleventh Circuit. Plaintiff was entitled to a jury, and the trial court erred in denying her the same. GRANT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY REVERSED.

EDITORIAL: Good gravy, this knucklehead is a dumbass, a smartass, and an asshole all at once! Boy, would I take this case on contingency. Black mark on the district judge, who either completely misread the record, or completely misread the record. Mention in Despatches to this poor lady's appellate lawyer, and I wish I knew who s/he was; too bad they didn't put counsel's names in the opinion. I'll find out later. Anyway, this is NOT why police officers are allowed to have power. Police are supposed to serve and protect, not snarl and snap at people to make them Respect Mah Authori-ta. This officer needs seeeerious anger management counseling, and if that doesn't work (and it probably won't) he needs to change careers. I hope he goes to a collection agency and cops that same attitude with one of MY clients, and then I'll get to sue him good.

Sunday, May 6, 2007

Don't Do Any Part Of The Crime In Front Of The Man

UNITED STATES v. MCNEILL, USCA-4 Nos. 06-4444, 06-4449, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 10140, on appeal from USDC-MDD, before USCJs Widener, Niemeyer, Motz, opinion by Niemeyer, filed 02 May 2007.

LONG STORY SHORT: Fourth Amendment probable cause justifying a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed "in the officer's presence" does not require all elements of the offense to occur in front of the officer. Binding in MD, NC, SC, VA, WV.

FACTS: Girlfriend got a Maryland state court to issue a protective order against Defendant. A few hours later, Girlfriend was at a convenience store in Baltimore and called 911 to ask for police protection from Defendant. Officer arrived at the store to see Defendant standing next to Girlfriend and her children. Officer separated them and tried to talk to Girlfriend first, who said Defendant was following her and messing with her. Defendant kept interfering, to the point that Officer had to instruct Defendant to "chill." When Girlfriend told Officer about the protective order, Defendant heard her and said "I'm going to get you, bitch, for this." Officer arrested Defendant for what Officer called "assault by threat," but there is no such offense under Maryland law, although Defendant's conduct did amount to the misdemeanor of harassment. Officer checked with dispatch to confirm the protective order, but dispatch could not find it; neither knew that the protective order was so recent that it was not in the system yet. Officer took Defendant in, where Defendant made statements that incriminated himself as to two recent bank robberies.

PROCEDURE: The United States indicted Defendant in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on two counts of bank robbery. Defendant moved to suppress his statements as the fruit of an unreasonable arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, on grounds that Officer had no probable cause to believe Defendant had committed harassment in Officer's presence. The trial court ruled that Defendant had committed no offense in Officer's presence, rendering Defendant's arrest illegal. Everything the police obtained as a result of the arrest, including Defendant's statements, were fruits of the poisonous tree. MOTION TO SUPPRESS GRANTED. The United States took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

DECISION: Police may generally arrest anyone for even very minor criminal offenses without violating the Fourth Amendment, so long as probable cause exists. It is long settled that officers may arrest for felonies not committed in the officer's presence, even without a warrant, but the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence. The Fourth Circuit's own precedent was not entirely clear either. However, that question proved to be moot, because upon closer inspection, Officer did indeed have probable cause to believe that Defendant committed a crime in his presence.

There is no such offense as "assault by threat" in Maryland, but so long as some actual crime occurred, Defendant gave Officer the power to arrest him. Maryland defines the misdemeanor offense of harassment, in pertinent part, as (1) following someone else around in a public place (2) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other, (3) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the other, and (4) without a legal purpose. Here, Girlfriend got a protective order, called 911, and complained to Officer that Defendant was harassing her, whereupon Defendant grew agitated and threatened Girlfriend. All of this gave Officer probable cause to believe that Defendant was continuing to commit harassment in front of him, even if he had begun his course of conduct some time before. Officer therefore had the power to arrest Defendant without offending any in-the-presence requirement or the Fourth Amendment. SUPPRESSION REVERSED.

EDITORIAL: If this relationship took its typical course, I'm sure Girlfriend has seen the error of her ways, and gone to see this turkey every day in the federal detention center, with as many of her kids in tow as the Bureau of Prisons will allow. When he catches 20 years for bank robbery, she'll probably come to her senses. But I digress.

Know your crimes, folks. Try not to threaten people with nonexistent crimes; such is considered--to invoke the ultimate British term of reproach--bad form. If nothing else, since the officer had to tell the guy to "chill" and stop interfering with his investigation, you could probably hook him up for obstruction. In North Carolina, we have about 30 different kinds of assault and threat, anything from ordinary common-law assault ("assault assault") to assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDWWITKISI or "the alphabet crime"), with all sorts of specific situations like assault on a sports official and cyberstalking. I wish we'd do like Florida and just have assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery. Anyway, I predict that if this issue ever does come up before SCOTUS, they'll find no in-the-presence requirement for misdemeanors.

Tuesday, May 1, 2007

Wolpoff & Abramson Refuses To Read Law Books, Attacks FDCPA Champion, Gets Smacked

CROW v. WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, LLP, USDC-MND Civil No. 06-3228, 2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 31356, before USMJ Mayeron, filed 19 Apr 2007. LONG STORY SHORT: Collection agency's self-designated affirmative defense seeking attorney fees under Rule 11, Section 1927, and FDCPA bad-faith provision was not an affirmative defense at all, and would be stricken. Not binding anywhere but may be persuasive. FACTS: Defendant, a lawyer-owned collection agency with a nationwide business, mailed a dunning letter dated 15 May 2006 to Plaintiff, who was out of town on a job site and then at his lake house, and did not receive the letter until 30 May 2006. Plaintiff mailed a validation request to Defendant on 22 June 2006, within the 30-day time limit after receiving the dunning letter. Instead of validating the alleged debt, Defendant responded only with a "Notice of Intent to Sue" letter dated 28 June 2006. PROCEDURE: Plaintiff sued Defendant in U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota per 15 U.S.C. § 1692g for proceeding with collection efforts before validating the debt. Apparently unaware that Plaintiff had in fact requested validation within the 30-day limit, Defendant included in its answer the following, designated Sixth Affirmative Defense (hereinafter SAD): "Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel's pursuit of Defendant is in bad faith and solely to harass and annoy, entitling Defendant to any award of attorney's fees, as well as their costs and disbursements incurred herein as sanctions, and that if Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel continues to prosecute or further this litigation or fails to immediately dismiss this lawsuit, will be in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) and will be liable for Defendant's attorneys fees and costs for multiplying the proceedings in this cases unreasonable and vexatiously, asserting claims solely to harass and annoy Defendant and in asserting claims contrary to the applicable law in this area." Plaintiff's counsel, well-known FDCPA consumer advocate Thomas J. Lyons Jr., emailed Defendant's in-house lawyer Jill N. Brown to explain the apparent delay in responding, and asked that Defendant withdraw SAD. Instead, Defendant chose to disbelieve Plaintiff, and refused to withdraw SAD. Plaintiff moved per Rule 12(f) to strike SAD as legally insufficient and scandalous. Defendant argued that even if SAD was not an affirmative defense, the trial court should treat SAD as a counterclaim. DECISION: Rule 12(f) motions to strike are disfavored, but are appropriate when an affirmative defense is either scandalous or legally insufficient. Affirmative defenses are supposed to raise issues outside the scope of a plaintiff's pleadings. If true, an affirmative defense will defeat a plaintiff's claim even if what the plaintiff says is also true. Instead, SAD was just a denial of Plaintiff's pleaded facts, to wit, that he did not get the letter until less than 30 days before he requested validation. Rule 11 requires a separate motion, and cannot be raised by affirmative defense or counterclaim. [Note: If W&A actually pulled out Rule 11 and read it, they would know this.] Therefore, the SAD request for Rule 11 sanctions was procedurally insufficient. 1692k(a)(3) and Section 1927 fees are not counterclaims either, because counterclaims are independent grounds for relief, whereas bad faith and vexatiousness depend on resolution of the original action. Here, facts as to when Plaintiff got Defendant's letter needed to be resolved before addressing any question of bad faith. Plaintiff's argument that SAD was scandalous, meaning that it unnecessarily reflected on the character of an individual or stated anything in repulsive language that detracted from the dignity of the court, was superfluous. SAD was legally insufficient as an affirmative defense or counterclaim, so the trial court would not address whether it was also scandalous. MOTION TO STRIKE GRANTED. EDITORIAL: Score one for the good guys against the functionally illiterate hooligans of Wolpoff & Abramson. THEY accuse Tom Lyons of harassment and annoyance? Talk about the snowflake calling the bedsheet white! Wolpoff & Abramson refers to itself as a law firm, but it is nothing better than a few hundred nonlawyer bill collectors underneath a fistful of arrogant jerks with law licenses. Naturally, the nonlawyer bill collectors take this as permission to abuse and terrorize consumers, cruelly delighting in their fraudulent power. You think I'm making this up? I've had the displeasure of negotiating the maze of Wolpoff & Abramson's massive phone system, trying to talk to a real lawyer about my clients' cases. What, real lawyers work at Wolpoff & Abramson? You'd never know it from calling them. I was handed off from one clueless cretin to another, having to re-explain myself every time. I finally arrived at some petty manager's desk, and among other things he told me "You are the debtor! You don't tell US what to do!" Hmmm ... watch me. At length, a more mild-mannered drone personally promised me that Mr. Ronald Abramson Esq. himself would be calling by the end of the day. That was last year, and I'm still waiting. We see from this case that nothing changes at Wolpoff & Abramson. How about pulling out a law book and reading it sometime? Isn't that what REAL LAWYERS do? It seems that like real men don't ask directions, real lawyers don't read statutes, rules, or cases. Well, Wolpoff & Abramson are nearly billionaires now, so I guess at some level it works. Keep up this foolishness, Wolpoff & Abramson, and I'll retire off of you.